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outside a field: the strange case of David
Cameron in the UK political field
Aeron Davis
GOLDSMITHS COLLEGE, LONDON
Emily Seymour
GOLDSMITHS COLLEGE, LONDON
Public figures, media and symbolic power
As societies become more ‘mediated’ so the elevation of public figures is
increasingly linked to their ability to generate a positive public profile through
the mass media. Politicians, artists, film stars, authors and others each gain
professional status, in part, based on how consumer-citizens actively respond to
media representations of themselves. The linking of media to individual
celebrity and symbolic power is now implicit in much writing. Individuals
succeed because of their personal charisma (Weber, 1948) and an innate ability
to present a media personality that directly engages with large publics
(Ankersmit, 1997; Horton and Wohl, 1993; Pels, 2003; Street, 2003).
Alternatively, one’s symbolic image is primarily manufactured by promotional
professionals (Boorstin, 1962; Evans, 2005; Franklin, 2004; Hall Jamieson,
1996; Lilleker and LeesMarshment, 2006) and parts of the media industry itself
(Evans and Hesmondhalgh, 2005; Turner, 2004). However one’s public image
develops, media exposure then bestows a ‘primary definer’ status on those
placed in positions of power thus drawing additional media coverage (Bennett,
1990; Champagne, 2005; Hall et al., 1978, Herman and Chomsky, 2002).
From this varied literature, we learn about how leading public figures have
‘para-social relationships’ with their publics (Horton and Wohl, 1993), are
successfully marketed as commodities or are presented as ‘primary definers’.
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Something less explored is the issue of how actors come to be initially
selected within a professional field and how such media-oriented considerations
influence that selection process.
Such concerns suggest that public figures succeed because they manage to
gain recognition and support from amix of audiences: insider peer, intermediary
media and external public. In some sectors, such as avant-garde art or a big-
budget film it is not necessary for all such audiences to be in accord. In others,
individual status within an occupation, is enhanced by a combination of one’s
perceived professional attributes and, also, by one’s ability to generate large-
scale aggregate responses from a public (for more on this see Moran, 1999;
Wright, 2007). A large proportion of each of the three audience types
(professional, intermediary and public) must accept the representation of an
individual, even if the evaluative criteria vary accordingly. For each of the
audiences involved, to a greater or lesser extent, media representation is a key
part of the evaluation of individuals. Media exposure, in effect, is a means of
generating symbolic recognition inside a profession, among intermediaries
and outside it. The ability to gain media representation, in both quantity and
quality, via a range of media and audiences, becomes essential. How is this
achieved and can we conceptualize and empirically investigate the question
more systematically?
In order to engage with these questions this article draws on the work of
Pierre Bourdieu to develop the concept of ‘media capital’ and explores its
application in the political field. Bourdieu’s analytical tools have proved to be
extremely useful for observing individuals, their accumulation and deployment
of economic and cultural resources, and their movements within ‘fields’ and
wider society. However, despite a keen interest in media and politics (1998,
2005), Bourdieu never did focused research on the political or media fields
and did not himself use the term ‘media capital’. Thus, the following section
briefly introduces and adapts his research tools rather than attempting a fuller
engagement with his work.1
Bourdieu’s conceptual tools
In Bourdieu’s sociology the key conceptual tools are ‘habitus’, ‘field’and ‘forms
of capital’. Individuals develop, and are guided by, their ‘habitus’ from early
childhood onwards. This is mainly determined by their social environment
(family, friends, education). For much of their adult existence such environments
consist of occupational ‘fields’, such as art, literature, law or the social sciences.
Sociologically, the ‘field’ is defined as ‘a separate social universe having its own
laws of functioning independently’, but also a ‘war of everyone against everyone,
that is, universal competition’ (Bourdieu, 1993: 162–3). Individuals enter into a
field and move through the positions offered by that field and according to its
specific, established ‘laws’ (norms, values, hierarchies). In order to enter into a
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particular field an actor must first possess a certain habitus and the appropriate
mix and accumulation of ‘forms of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986). While operating
there they continue to accumulate, exchange and lose field-specific forms of
capital as they move up and down the field’s hierarchies.
For Bourdieu, the two most significant forms of capital for individuals to
accumulate and utilize are ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’. Economic capital is
self-explanatory. Cultural capital, in its ‘objectified’ (cultural goods) and
‘institutionalized’ (qualifications) states is transferable. Cultural capital, in its
‘embodied state’, cannot be bought or sold, but accumulates through a mix of
formal education and social or professional experience. Other forms of
capital, regarded as less significant by Bourdieu, are ‘social’ and ‘symbolic’.
‘Social capital’ is ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 286).
The term ‘symbolic capital’ is used more ambiguously across Bourdieu’s
work. In some cases it is presented as something that simply relays existing
symbolic power as an aggregate reflection of other capital forms possessed by
powerful institutions and actors (meta-capital). But, elsewhere in his writing,
it becomes something to be accumulated as a capital form in its own right by
individuals, among their peers, within a field, as well as beyond it, among
citizens (Bourdieu, 1991, 1998).
Fields and their participants link socially and communicatively to the wider
public through several mechanisms. Bourdieu’s position is that all fields
themselves operate within the larger ‘field of power’ (wider society) and that
fields vary in the degree of socio-cultural autonomy they have from this.
Accordingly, he describes the social architecture of a field as, in part, revolving
around an axis of two poles: the heteronomous and the autonomous. The
heteronomous pole is where the field, with its participants and outputs, is
most outward-looking and connected to the wider social world. The more
autonomous pole is least outward-looking and closer to the purer social and
cultural elements of the field itself. It is down to a range of ‘cultural
intermediaries’ (Bourdieu, 1984) to link fields and larger society via mass
media and other communicative apparatus. These aspects of Bourdieu’s work
remain relatively under-theorized (see Couldry, 2003, and Hesmondhalgh,
2006, on this point).
How is this discussion transposed onto the contemporary ‘political field’
and how does the mass media act as the communicative conduit between field
and society? For Bourdieu, the ‘political field’ refers to that of formal,
institutional politics, parties and professional politicians (Bourdieu, 1991,
2005). It operates like any other field: ‘with certain (electoral) procedures,
etc., is an autonomous world, a microcosm set within the social macrocosm’
(Bourdieu, 2005: 32). Like all fields, the political field is one of continuous
personal and party struggle over position (social, ideological, political).
Struggle is also between: political purists, equivalent to the intellectual avant
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garde, located at the more ‘autonomous pole’ of the field, and those seeking
broader public appeal, the more ‘heteronomous pole’, a ‘realpolitik’ at any
cost (Bourdieu, 1991: 189–90, 2005: 30–34). Individual politicians make use
of their capital forms in order to win such struggles and progress within
political hierarchies. The victors get to present their interests and ideas to the
wider citizenry outside the field and citizens, in turn, pass judgement on
politicians. Thus, politicians must be able to acquire symbolic capital among
several audiences in order to succeed. As Bourdieu puts it: ‘Political capital
is a form of symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief or recognition
or, more precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents
confer on a person’ (1991: 192).
News media and reporters are the significant media and intermediaries
linking the political field and wider citizenry. The accrual of news ‘media
capital’ thus becomes a necessary step in the accumulation of the symbolic and
social capital necessary to acquire further political capital in politics. That said,
identifying what media capital is is complicated by the multiple roles occupied
by news producers. For many media scholars, news media symbolically
represent politics to the public. At the same time reporters very much operate
socially as part of the fields they report on (Barnett and Gaber, 2001; Cook,
1998; Davis, 2007; Herbst, 1998). They have long-term posts in political
institutions spending more time there than in their news organizations. For
others still, journalists are most guided by the norms and practices of the
professional field of journalism itself (Benson, 1998; Benson and Neveu, 2005;
Bourdieu, 1998, 2005; Champagne, 2005; Couldry, 2003 ). Thus, journalists are
cultural intermediaries who move between professional fields, newsrooms and
publics. This suggests that there is not one but several forms, or components, of
media capital which individuals can seek to accumulate in relation to their
varied audiences (peers, intermediaries, public). These operate within a
political field and external to it, and on both a personal and institutional basis.
Forms of media capital and their accumulation in the political field
The concept of ‘media capital’ is now ready to be broken down into its
distinctive forms or components. One important means of distinction is
between that generated within a political field and that outside it, among the
citizenry. Media capital, produced and wielded outside the field, which is
linked to the wider citizenry, is a means of acquiring symbolic power, and
linked to the symbolic meta-capital of the state. As Couldry (2003) advances,
it might simply be referred to as ‘media meta-capital’. That generated within
the political field, linked to politicians and journalist intermediaries,
contributes to the total symbolic (or political) capital within the field. It might
be classed as ‘internal media capital’. Politicians, accordingly, behave differently,
and are judged differently, in relation to their immediate internal, intermediary
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or external audiences. How political insiders then judge, and thus bestow
symbolic capital on, other politicians, varies considerably from how a wider
public judge, and thus bestow it. Such a conclusion is also to be deduced from
several non-field oriented studies of politics, culture and communication
(Alberoni, 2006; Ankersmit, 1997; Corner, 2003; Davis, 2007).
A second obvious means of distinguishing forms of media capital is between
that linked to institutionalized position and that linked to individual personality.
Bourdieu (1991) himself identified two symbolic forms of capital in the political
field. These he called ‘personal’ and ‘delegated’. Delegated, like Weber’s (1948)
‘legal-rational’ form of authority, is linked to recognized official positions. This
‘institutionalized media capital’ is associated with the position of an individual
within a political party or state institution, to be reproduced through media to the
wider social world. The alternative, ‘personal’or ‘charismatic’ (Weber, 1948) form
is ‘individualized media capital’. Individuals may build up personalized forms of
media capital with all sorts of performances or associations in media and over
time. Thus, several studies (Alberoni, 2006; Boorstin, 1962; West and Orman,
2003), describe the public communication of an individual politician’s ‘natural’,
‘innate’, ‘heroic’ or ‘charismatic’ qualities. For others (Pels, 2003; Stanyer and
Wring, 2004; Street, 2003) politicians must project a ‘persona’ that combines the
familiar and unfamiliar, the ordinary and extraordinary, both impressing an
external audience and developing a ‘para-social relationships’with it.
How are these forms of media capital accrued? At a simple, quantifiable
level such capital is accumulated through media exposure, in terms of number
of appearances and the size of the media outlet’s circulation. Clearly, the
audience, whether internal field, intermediary or general public, is also
significant, as specific audiences bestow symbolic capital. Lastly, the more
qualitative, discursive framework implicit in media texts is a more complex
contributory factor.
According to these definitions, externally generated, ‘institutionalized
media meta-capital’ is the most straightforward in terms of its accumulation.
There is often a natural hierarchy of political positions that may be correlated
with a parallel accumulation of media capital. Thus, as work on media-source
relations tends to confirm (Bennett, 1990; Hall et al., 1978; Herman and
Chomsky, 2002), political elites automatically come to be the dominant news
sources and agenda setters for news. Externally generated, ‘individualized
media meta-capital’ is more elusive; the holy grail that political organizations
increasingly look for when selecting leaders and spokespersons. The personal
performances and journalist presentation of actors through media becomes
important in terms of conveying the right mix of personal qualities that
engages citizens. Although, once selected, the increasing employment of
professional promotional intermediaries (Boorstin, 1962; Hall Jamieson,
1996; Lilleker and Lees Marshment, 2006; Wernick, 1991), suggests that the
political personality presented to the public may, to a degree, be manufactured,
focus-group tested and managed.
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Two means of internal media capital accumulation with journalists are
through an accrual of ‘journalist-based social capital’ and ‘media cultural
capital’. Since politicians and correspondents have intense and regular
exchanges, politicians build up their social capital with journalists as they
gather contacts and foster good relationships with them during their career.
Media cultural capital is based on an accumulation of knowledge about how
news production works and journalists operate. This comes with political
experience, specialist media skills training and, increasingly, from prior
professional experience as a journalist or public relations specialist. These
means of influencing one’s own media exposure to the external social world
are gained quite independent of an individual’s institutional position or
telegenic qualities and, therefore, are a way of challenging such determinants.
The other obvious means of accumulating symbolic capital through the media
is through public ‘mediated performance capital’. Performances can contribute to
the accumulation of each of the four forms of media capital identified and
potentially sets up a dynamic exchange between forms generated within and
external to a political field. This is because political performances are directed
towards multiple audiences and, accordingly, are judged (or decoded) in
alternative ways by those audiences. This mediated evaluation of others’
performance takes place in a number of settings which can be linked to the more
‘autonomous’ (internal media capital) and ‘heteronomous’ (external media meta-
capital) poles of a political field. Starting with the most autonomous, the first form
of mediated judgement comes in personal exchanges between politicians and
journalists, or performances observed by journalists in more private settings
(exclusive meetings, briefings, lunches). The second is during recorded (print,
broadcast, web) performances in public forums (debating chambers, public
meeting spaces, conferences) established within the political field. Journalists and
politicians frequently observe such performances, or review them again, if present,
through media texts. A third form of evaluation comes as politicians and
journalists, alongwith the general public, observe and evaluate others only through
media outputs. This may be in elite-oriented, ‘highbrow’ media with particular
symbolic significance to a political field (the Today Programme orQuestion Time
in the UK). Moving towards the ‘heteronomous’ end come political performances
in more accessible, daily mainstream news bulletins, followed by wider, cultural
products such as satires, comedy programmes and chat shows.
Although these differing forms of media capital are distinctive, there is also a
complex interplay and exchange at work between them. The ability to generate
one form influences the accumulation of another. In terms of institutionalized
and individualized forms of media capital, the perceptions of an individual over
time, may shift according to changes in the public standing of the organizations
and institutions they represent. The reverse is also true. The same is also apparent
in terms of internal media capital and external media-meta capital. Politicians do
not just generate media meta-capital outside the political field.A large part of the
process involves generating media capital inside it and that, in turn, helps people
to move into institutionally recognized positions that automatically bring media
744 Media, Culture & Society 32(5)
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coverage (media meta-capital) outside it. Similarly, the ability of an individual
to generate media meta-capital, from outside the political field, may influence
how others within the political field evaluate them personally.
Applying the analytical framework: the strange case of David Cameron
and the UK political field
The theoretical discussion is now further illustrated by a UK-based case study
detailing David Cameron’s rise to the head of the Conservative Party in 2005.
The case presented focuses on the UK political field and its associated political
and reporting structures. However, the analytical framework and applied
research methods are potentially applicable to cases of political progression
in many other ‘mediated’ democracies. Such issues are increasingly prominent
across a range of political and media systems (see Corner and Pels, 2003;
Lilleker and Lees Marshment, 2006; Stanyer and Wring, 2004).
The question posed here is: how did Cameron, a young, relatively obscure
politician, with little internal, symbolic/political capital or external, media meta-
capital, come from obscurity to lead his party? For many observers, Cameron was
simply an instant news creation born of the over-enthusiastic reporting of a single
conference speech. The sizeable bestowal of external media meta-capital that
resulted catapulted him ahead of his rivals. However, as argued here, Cameron’s
success was based on his long-term accumulation of alternative forms of media
and political capital. This accumulation continued apace during the extended party
electoral period. Cameron’s conference speech then confirmedwhatmany insiders
already suspected: that he was the candidate most capable of accumulating media
capital in all its forms and among all key audiences. Members of Parliament
(MPs), party members and journalists responded accordingly.
The arguments presented here are based on the findings of two research
methods. One was a content analysis of four national daily newspapers and
their equivalent Sunday titles: the Daily/Sunday Telegraph, the Times/Sunday
Times, the Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday and the Sun/News of the World. These
papers were selected on the basis that they were the ones most commonly
read by Conservative MPs, party members and voters. The quantitative
content analysis, which went from 6 May to 21 October 2005, looked at 813
pieces. The other method drew on responses gathered from 39 semi-
structured interviews with elected politicians (24) and political reporters (15).
Each was asked about their recollection of events during the leadership
contest and why they thought David Cameron had triumphed.
David Cameron as instant media creation
Following the party’s general election, the then leader of the Conservative
Party, Michael Howard, announced his resignation on 6 May 2005. The
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party’s leadership election was delayed while the existing electoral rules were
debated. Over the summer, David Davis, the shadow Home Secretary, was the
clear favourite to succeed out of more than 15 potential candidates. At the end
of September five put themselves forward as the official election began in the
week before the party’s annual conference in Blackpool: David Davis, Ken
Clarke, Liam Fox, David Cameron and Malcolm Rifkind. Rifkind then
dropped out. According to the party’s electoral rules, to win the contest
candidates first had to gain the support of MPs, whose two ballots would
decide who the two final candidates would be. Party members would then
cast the final vote. Accordingly, gaining internal media capital, among the
party’s 198 MPs, and external media meta-capital, among its 240,000
members (PM), would have been essential. There were two further, non-
voting audiences that could influence the outcome: political lobby reporters2
and general voters (GV). The support of this last group would be necessary
in any future general election fought against Tony Blair’s Labour Party, and
was a background consideration during the contest.
Looking at Table 1, summarizing poll data of the time, it becomes clear
that the main audiences differed considerably in their levels of support for
the candidates. For most of the period, only David Davis had clear MP
support although he never gained strong general voter support and his party
member support fell away dramatically after the conference. In contrast, Ken
Clarke became a clear leader with those general voters and party members
outside the political field, but he lacked strong support from fellow MPs
inside it and went out at the first ballot. David Cameron struggled to make
an impact on any of the audiences until the week of the conference, but then
leaped ahead of his rivals for all audiences almost simultaneously.
This dramatic transition makes little sense when looking at the more overt
indicators of support in terms of political and media meta-capital. Cameron
was relatively little known to MPs, having only been elected in 2001, and
then appointed to his first shadow cabinet position in May 2005. He also
evidently lacked in external media meta-capital, in terms of having the least
media exposure (number of articles mentioned in), and drawing little public
recognition. Table 2 shows the media mentions of the lead candidates in the
eight selected news titles for the three years prior to the election period.
Cameron’s coverage was less than a quarter of that of Ken Clarke and less
than a ninth of that of David Davis. Ken Clarke was the most politically
experienced and publicly recognized of the candidates having previously
been a minister (1979–87) and cabinet minister (1987–97). Subsequently, as
a prominent backbench MP, his institutional media capital had dropped. Liam
Fox, as a senior shadow cabinet member and co-party chairman (1999–2005),
came second in the three-year period with 1057 mentions. David Davis, who
had been a Conservative government minister (1994–7), Chair of the party
(2001–3) and then shadow Home Secretary (2003–5), was a clear leader in
terms of recently accrued political capital and institutional position. As would
be expected he was also ahead of each of his rivals in media meta-capital
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TABLE 1
Polls of candidate support 29 May to 21 October 2005, from General Voters
(GV), Party Members (PM), and Conservative Members of Parliament (MP)
Date and poll D. Cameron % D. Davis % Ken Clarke %
GV PM MPs GV PM MPs GV PM MPs
29.5 Telg/YouGov 15 35 10
27.7 Times/Populus 4 12 29
4.9 S Times/YouGov 9 28 8
6.9 Times/Populus 2 10 41
6.9 Times/Populus 3 16 55
7.9 MORI 2 6 32
9.9 Newsnight/ICM 4 10 40
10.9 Telg/YouGov 17 27 33
11.9 S Times/YouGov 6 16 42
30.9 YouGov 16 30 30
7–9.10 S Times 18 16 25
9.10 YouGov 39 14 26
10.10 Decl MPs 17 35 11
11.10 Times/Populus 45 15 22
13.10 Decl MPs 16 33 12
17.10 D Mail/ 51 21 22
Const Chairs
17.10 D Mail/ 17 34 12
Decl MPs
18.10 1st Ballot (56) (62) (38)
MPs (198) 28 31 19
19.10 YouGov 59 15 –
20.10 2nd Ballot (90) (57) –
MPs (198) 45 29
21.10 MORI 33 13 –
6.12 Members Ballot 68 32 –
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terms. Many journalists at the time accordingly concluded that he was the
most likely winner. In May and June, before the contest officially opened,
some 52 articles commented on Davis’s favourite status.
As the official contest began in late September, it seemed that Cameron’s
campaign would not come close to overcoming his political and media capital
deficits. Cameron’s support with MPs was still low. His long-term media
meta-capital deficit was reflected in weak external recognition with only 3
percent of party members supporting his candidacy. His age, wealthy public
school background and identification as one of the ‘Notting Hill set’ (a term
used in some 77 articles), all counted against him being considered as a
serious candidate capable of attracting wider electoral support. Most of those
interviewed concurred. According to Ben Brogan, political editor of the Daily
Mail: ‘There seemed to be a collective decision that David Davis was going
to be a shoo in for the Conservative Party. They all said it was too early for
David Cameron.’
However, everything changed dramatically during the few days of the
conference where all five candidates were due to give speeches. After a
well-received speech by Cameron on 4 October, and a poorly received one
by David Davis the next day, Cameron was suddenly catapulted out of
obscurity to become the front-runner. Television reporters focused on these
performances and enthusiastically backed Cameron while criticizing Davis.
As Figures 1 and 2 show, press coverage did the same. The Figures show
the cumulative positive or negative coverage (linked to individualized
media meta-capital) for each of the four daily papers in question.3 In the
first week of October, Cameron has a sharp rise and Davis an equally sharp
fall as all four papers simultaneously passed strong judgements on the two
candidates.
Subsequently, all four audiences (journalists, MPs, party members and
general voters) came into alignment in terms of Cameron gaining the largest
support. By the time of the second ballot, on 20 October, Cameron had gained
748 Media, Culture & Society 32(5)
TABLE 2
Media exposure, in eight news titles, of candidates three years prior to the
campaign period (6 May 2002 to 5 May 2005)
D. Cameron D. Davis K. Clarke
6.5.02–5.11.02 17 327 170
6.11.02–5.5.03 14 181 215
6.5.03–5.11.03 21 213 183
6.11.03–5.5.04 26 343 91
6.5.04–5.11.04 49 290 56
6.11.04–5.5.05 64 444 90
Total 191 1798 805
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a strong lead among Conservative MPs and was clearly ahead in polls of
public and party member opinion. For the next six weeks little changed and,
on 6 December, Cameron won with more than two-thirds of the final vote.
For many interviewees who witnessed events everything completely changed
in a one- or two-day period. Ten of the 24 MPs interviewed, half of whom
were Conservatives, believed the media were responsible for Cameron’s rise
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FIGURE 1
Cumulative coverage, negative or positive, for David Cameron in The Times,
Telegraph, Mail and Sun newspapers, 6 May to 21 October 2005
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FIGURE 2
Cumulative coverage, negative or positive, for David Davis in The Times,
Telegraph, Mail and Sun newspapers, 6 May to 21 October 2005
 at Goldsmiths College Library on October 10, 2011mcs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
from nowhere. As one Labour politician remarked (Sion Simon MP): ‘I think
they made him up overnight … one of the most startling examples of the
modern era, I think, of the media just changing the course of political history
in an instant.’ Seven of the 15 journalists also stated that the media coverage
had played a pivotal role in boosting Cameron, if not during then after the
conference. Five said that television coverage, particularly that of ITN’s Tom
Bradby, was particularly significant:
Davis goes into that weekend ahead, big time ahead, and Cameron is one of a
group of possibles.… [Tom] Bradby called it, he had the guts to go out there and
call it. ‘Davis has bombed’ and it became a reality.… There was an unconscious or
conscious, bit of both, media desire to create Cameron. And he was created by the
media over those 24 hours, just as David Davis was destroyed by the media in
those 24 hours. (Peter Oborne, journalist, commentator)
David Cameron’s long-term accumulation of political and media
capital forms
As argued here, Cameron’s success was not as instant as portrayed. While he
lacked in the obvious measures of capital (social and symbolic capital with
MPs and media meta-capital), he had spent many years building up alternative,
internal forms of capital. These accumulations increased apace over the
five-month period prior to the party conference and were vital in triggering
the cultural tipping point reached during the conference.
Cameron had begun accumulating political capital, in its social (network)
and cultural (education, experience) forms, from an early age.After graduating
in 1988, with an Oxford University BA in Politics, Philosophy and Economics,
he spent six years working closely with many of the party’s most senior
leaders. This included stints at the CRD (Conservative Research Department),
briefing and election strategy work for the Prime Minister John Major, then
roles as a special advisor to the Chncellor Norman Lamont and Michael
Howard the Home Secretary (see Elliott and Hanning, 2007). In effect,
Cameron had worked in four of the key power centres of the party, when in
government, and had established social capital at the highest political levels.
Cameron’s connection to Howard, the 2005 party leader, was important.
Howard, who clearly backed Cameron over Davis (mentioned in 44 articles by
25 journalists in May and June), immediately promoted Cameron and several
allies, such as George Osborne, to the shadow cabinet. In delaying the contest
by several months he allowed time for Osborne and Cameron to develop their
stocks of media and political capital within and outside the political field.
Cameron, although lacking media meta-capital, had steadily accumulated
internal forms of media capital over many years. In his roles at the CRD, and
as an advisor to party leaders of the time, he had had extensive dealings with
political journalists. He then went on to spend seven years working at Carlton
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Communications (1994–2001), one of the dominant television companies of
the 1990s. As Head of Communications, then Director of Corporate Affairs,
he continued to have regular exchanges with journalists, as well as learning
more about the business of television production. In effect, Cameron had
accrued extensive insider media capital, in its cultural and journalist-based
social forms. His core campaign team provided additional such capital. It
included several experienced professional journalists (Ed Vaizey, Michael
Gove and Boris Johnson), as well as Steve Hilton, a Saatchi and Saatchi PR
strategist who had worked on the Conservatives’ winning 1992 election
campaign. Several interviewees commented on these elements of Cameron’s
past as well as his present media knowledge and social networks:
David Cameron started off being very well connected in the media, and there’s no
doubt it helped him because he got a lot of early air time. A lot of people in the
media were batting for him … but then that’s because he’d done the work over the
years to cultivate those contacts. (Chris Grayling, Conservative shadow minister)
Davis, in contrast to Cameron, had high levels of external media meta-capital
but relatively little in the way of internal media capital. He was thought to be
a weak public speaker and did not cultivate journalist contacts (see Elliott and
Hanning, 2007; Montgomery, 2006). Such differences directly influenced the
campaign strategies of the two candidates. Cameron’s individual presentation
attempted to appeal to the wider electorate beyond the Conservative Party. He
made several approaches to left-leaning journalists and publications, and
consciously positioning himself as the ‘heir to Blair’. Some 70 articles, from
43 journalists, drew such Cameron–Blair comparisons. Davis instead focused
more on maintaining his strong support among MPs, appealed to core party
members and made little additional effort with lobby correspondents. Several
pieces accordingly questioned these tactics and his support (e.g. Jones and
Helm, 2005; Kavanagh, 2005; Sylvester, 2005a). As Iain Dale, Davis’s cam-
paign manager admitted: ‘There was a feeling among the media that they were
being intimidated by certain members of the Davis leadership team … it all
crystallized obviously around the conference when David made the speech.’
Through the summer period, Cameron and his team proved to be more active
than any other group. The media activity levels of the two lead candidates is
illustrated in Figure 3 and Table 3. David Davis got the most media exposure
(561 articles, 75.2 percent of the total) of the four candidates, followed by
Cameron (524, 70.2 percent), Clarke (424, 56.9 percent), and Fox (279, 34.3
percent). However, when compared to the earlier six-month pre-election period
(see Table 2), it is Clarke and Cameron who have the most significant upward
shifts in external media meta-capital accrual. Davis’s total exposure for the
campaign period was up by a quarter on the previous six months. Clarke had
almost a five-fold rise and Cameron a nine-fold increase. Cameron and his allies
were also the most proactive as news sources in terms of supplying information
to journalists. Looking at Table 3, Cameron, whether cited as a direct or indirect
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TABLE 3
Sources cited/referred to between 6 May and 21 October 2005
Source Total (%) Direct Indirect Interview/article
D. Cameron 121 34 79 8
Cameron ally 104 74 28 2
Cameron total 225 (20.6) 108 107 10
D. Davis 111 34 72 5
Davis ally 98 67 28 3
Davis total 209 (19.1) 101 100 8
K. Clarke 97 25 69 3
Clarke ally 102 53 49 0
Clarke total 199 (18.2) 78 118 3
L. Fox 72 22 45 5
Fox ally 35 21 14 0
Fox total 107 (9.8) 43 59 5
M. Howard/Spokesp 28 13 15 0
Other Conservative 253 154 94 5
MP/Senior Pty
Local chair/memb 49 45 4 0
Other 23 15 6 2
Other total 353 (32.3) 227 119 7
All source total 1093 (100) 557 503 33
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FIGURE 3
Cumulative media exposure for four lead candidates in The Times, Telegraph,
Mail and Sun newspapers, 6 May to 21 October 2005
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source, was the most active individual.4 He wrote more articles and/or was the
subject of an interview piece, more than anyone else. Cameron’s allies appeared
more than any other candidate’s team. This activity by Cameron was clearly
noticed by those who regularly reported political affairs:
There had been a number of [Cameron] speeches that hadn’t really made it onto the
telly … we all go to many, many, many events that don’t end up on the telly.… But,
of course, it informs our opinion … so a lot of journalists had been following his
progress for quite a while, but hadn’t really talked about it much in their newspa-
pers or on the telly because they hadn’t had much of an opportunity. (Daisy
McAndrew, political broadcast editor)
Clearly, throughout the summer period, Cameron had done more than any
other candidate to increase his levels of media capital, both inside and outside
the field. His exposure in print media (external media meta-capital) was
significantly higher than would be expected in terms of his institutional position
as a minor shadow cabinet member. He had continued to build on his social
capital with lobby journalists and had accumulated a certain level of mediated
performance capital at the autonomous end of the field in several private
addresses witnessed by journalists. At the end of September what he was most
missing was individual-form, mediated performance capital at the heteronomous
end of the scale. His ability to potentially establish a ‘para-social relationship’
with party members and general voters, beyond the political field had yet to be
tested. Three particular events changed that and encouraged the relatively small
journalist interpretive community, dominated by 20–30 political lobby
reporters, towards a Cameron endorsement.5
The first of these was Cameron’s official campaign launch to journalists on
29 September. The launch was chosen especially to follow Davis’s own
launch earlier on the same day and contrasted strongly. Davis’s was in a dark,
old oak-panelled room whereas Cameron’s was set in a modern, light room
with ‘fashionable’ music and refreshments. According to several accounts,
Davis performed hesitantly whereas Cameron performed confidently. The
immediate news coverage was politely positive about both candidates but a
handful of established reporters were obviously impressed with Cameron
(Bennett, 2005; Letts, 2005a; Parris, 2005; Riddell, 2005). Days later, this
opinion had spread more widely across the reporting community (e.g.
Sylvester, 2005b; Thompson, 2005). William Rees-Mogg (2005) wrote in the
Mail on Sunday that: ‘Most journalists thought that David Cameron had a
much better launch than David Davis. David Cameron has some of Blair’s
skills.’ The launches were clearly remembered by several political journalist
interviewees who commented on them without prompting:
the whole political lobby was there for both of them [launches], we went to David
Davis’ first.… Davis was not intellectually self-confident enough to take more than
three questions … then we went down the road and we went into Cameron’s
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launch, and they’d made some effort with the production … and on comes
Cameron, he talks without notes, and is intellectual and self-confident enough to
take virtually every question in the room.And everybody felt that difference … and
people were coming and saying well, you know, ‘We’re going to give this guy a
good press, he’s a lot better than the other guy’, and ‘Davis looks like he’s going
nowhere.’ (Gary Gibbon, political broadcast editor)
The second, significant event was a BBC Newsnight piece, broadcast on 3
October, the eve of Cameron’s speech. In the piece, Frank Luntz, a political
consultant, had organized a focus group of potential Conservative voters.
Clips of the five candidates speaking in public were presented to the audience
and David Cameron received the most favourable response. One week later,
during the conference, the Cameron team sent round DVDs, which included
this piece, to all Conservative MPs and several journalists. This in itself drew
some favourable journalist commentary (e.g.Aaronovitch, 2005; Hurst, 2005;
Portillo, 2005).
The third event was the conference speeches where, once again, the mediated
performance skills of the five candidates were going to be directly compared. By
almost all accounts, print and interview, Cameron’s speech made a strong impact
but was not considered the best of the five (in most opinions it was either Rifkind
or Clarke). The lead editors and commentators of the Times,Mail and Telegraph
were impressed with both Clarke and Cameron, but each endorsed Clarke (e.g.
Jones, 2005; Letts, 2005b;Webster, 2005). However, several interviewees stated
that broadcast coverage was particularly enthusiastic about Cameron. Davis’s
speech followed the next day and, as many political journalists had privately
predicted, it failed to ‘inspire’. This perception was, according to Iain Dale:
‘helped by some good briefing by the Cameron people who also made sure that
a lot of their supporters were sat in front of the press desks and didn’t give David
Davis a standing ovation’. Bradby’s early bulletin, declaring it to be a speech that
‘bombed’, once again led the coverage that followed. By that evening a clear
tipping point within the journalist interpretive community had been reached as
support moved strongly towards Cameron and away from Davis. The next day
all press reports, even if supportive of Davis’s policy statements, condemned
his delivery and presentation with terms such as: ‘uninspiring’, ‘smug’,
‘monotonous’, ‘dismal’, ‘underwhelming’ and ‘lacklustre’. The contrast in how
mediated performance capital was accumulated inside and outside the political
field by the two candidates was summed up by David Blunkett MP:
the collective, instinctive decision of the media gathered in Blackpool, that
David Davis had failed and that David Cameron was the born-again Blair, was
absolutely profound … it was a judgement on a particular type of performance,
because David Davis did much better on the [Radio Four] Today Programme
that same day than David Cameron, but he undoubtedly flopped in his formal
[televised] platform speech. And, therefore, the platform speech became the
new benchmark.
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Conclusion
This piece has adapted Bourdieu’s interpretive research framework to the field
of politics and developed the concept of ‘media capital’. It has suggested that
‘media capital’ is accumulated in several forms, among contrasting audiences
and by various means. Most significantly, it has argued that successful public
figures need to generate media capital both within and external to their field.
Although these forms and means of accumulation are distinct, they are also
connected and, therefore, link field participants, cultural intermediaries and
their publics. This helps to explain the cultural mechanisms by which symbolic
power, established in institutionally based hierarchies, shifts over time and,
also, how individual ‘primary definers’ rise and fall.
This schema was used to interpret a UK-specific case of political
advancement – the rise of David Cameron. Cameron’s particular success was,
in large part, down to his long-term accumulation of less visible forms of
media capital within the UK political field. His accrual of journalist-based
social capital, media cultural capital and internal, mediated performance
capital, especially during an intense five-month period, did much to influence
opinion inside Westminster. Davis’s own media capital was mainly in the
form of institutionalized, external media meta-capital, with little equivalent
inside the field. The televised speeches, as well as less publicized events,
demonstrated that Cameron was more capable than Davis of generating
external, individualized media meta-capital and, consequently, achieving
electoral success. Cameron’s potential here clearly influenced his internal
symbolic/political and media capital generation. What is clear from the
timeline (see Table 1) is that party member support trends, for both Cameron
and Davis, were ahead of MP support trends. Coverage of the conference
speeches, particularly that of television journalists, was crucial in redirecting
party member support for the candidates. Continued journalist support,
combined with striking member and public poll support, then persuaded MPs
to switch in large numbers towards Cameron. In effect, those inside the
political field (journalists and MPs), within their interpretive communities,
were led to redirect their support according to how they believed party
members and future general voters would be directing their votes.
The forms of media capital framework, although applied to a UK case
study, may equally be applied to other political and media systems in mature,
‘mediated’ democracies. Such comparisons of media capital forms, and their
means of accumulation, may also shed light on competitive elections between,
for example: Gerhardt Schroder and Edmund Stoiber (2002) or Angela
Merkel (2005), Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal (2007), Al Gore and
George W. Bush (2000) or Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama (2008). In each
case, strong contrasts between the candidates’ forms and stocks of media and
political capital played a part in overall campaign outcomes.
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Notes
Thanks to the Leverhulme-sponsored Spaces of the News Project for funding this
research. Thanks also to Rod Benson and Nick Couldry for their valuable comments
on earlier drafts of this article.
1. For some in-depth discussions of Bourdieu’s work and its potential incorpora-
tion into media studies see Benson (1998), Couldry (2003), Benson and Neveu (2005)
and Hesmondhalgh (2006).
2. Specialist political correspondents reporting on Parliament in the UK are also
referred to as ‘lobby journalists’.
3. All articles were given a positive/negative rating from plus two (outright
endorsement) to minus two (unequivocal criticism). A majority were neutral or
balanced, scoring 0. When there were more negative or positive pieces, in total in a
week, that pushed the cumulative coverage up or down.
4. In Table 3 ‘direct’ sources means either directly talking to the newspaper or a
likely general briefing. ‘Indirect’ sources refers to interview, statement or article in
other titles, television or press release. The last column refers to an interview with, or
a piece written by, the individual.
5. Just 14 journalists accounted for 51 percent (413 pieces) of the 813 recorded
pieces of the eight titles. Adding those from excluded titles and lead television and
radio journalists, and one might estimate that no more than 20–30 journalists domi-
nated the coverage received by the public.
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